Private equity firms increasingly sell their portfolio companies to other private equity firms. We show that these "secondary buyouts" are costly for institutional investors both because the induced transaction costs are large and because secondary buyouts significantly underperform primary buyouts. Consistent with both the agency conflict view of Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2009) and the fundamental view of Jensen (1989), the underperformance of secondary buyouts is confined to the secondary buyouts made under buying pressure, i.e. towards the end of the fund's investment period. 
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In the past two decades, leveraged buyout investments by specialized private equity firms have grown from a niche phenomenon to a ubiquitous form of corporate ownership. Stromberg (2008) documents that private equity firm backed leveraged buyout transactions since 2001 totaled over $2 trillion worldwide. Stromberg (2008) also documents an increase in the "staying power" of leveraged buyouts (first investigated by Kaplan, 1991) . Firms stay longer under private equity ownership and there is a rise in socalled secondary buyouts -transactions in which a private equity firm sells a company to another private equity firm. This paper examines secondary buyouts (SBOs) from the point of view of the investors in private equity funds (so-called limited partners). There are two reasons why SBOs may hurt investor returns compared to primary buyouts (PBOs). First, as portfolio allocations to buyout funds have grown, investors have increased the number of funds they hold. As a result investors -especially the large ones -are ever more likely to be on both sides of a secondary buyout transaction. We call this phenomenon limited partner overlap ("LP overlap" for short). A limited partner invested in both the buying fund and the selling fund of a secondary buyout pays the transaction fees on each side, but only enjoys a small portfolio rebalancing from the transaction. The combination of high transaction fees (typical of all buyouts) and low portfolio rebalancing (specific to SBOs) should, ceteris paribus, hurt LP returns in buyout funds.
Second, we argue that secondary buyouts are likely to figure prominently in the agency conflict identified by Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2009) : "If the GP [general partner] has not encountered enough good projects and is approaching the end of the investment horizon […] a GP with untapped funds has the incentive to "go for broke" and take bad deals."
1 If a GP wants to burn money, SBOs are a cheaper and safer investment choice than primary buyouts. The reason is that the most important costs for a private equity firm making a buyout investment are search costs and due diligence costs.
In the case of a primary buyout, the private equity firm must spend considerable time to identify companies suitable for a buyout, convince the shareholders to sell, and then make sure that the asset is not a lemon (due diligence). By contrast, any company present in the portfolio of another private equity firm is a priori up for sale. As a result, both the lemons and the oranges of a private equity firm are for sale and sourcing a deal is much easier for a secondary buyout than for a primary buyout. The due diligence cost remains substantial, but is likely less than for a primary buyout.
Empirically, we begin by quantifying the direct cost of LP overlap. Given reasonable assumptions about transaction fees in buyouts, we show that the transaction cost borne by a limited partner in SBOs amounts to a large portion of the limited partner's portfolio rebalancing induced by the transaction. We also document that LP overlap in SBOs occurs frequently for limited partners invested in many private equity funds.
Our second set of empirical results stems from our analysis of the cross section of buyout returns. Our key finding supports the view that the GPs sometimes "go for broke" towards the end of the investment horizon. Investing in SBOs appears to be one of the manifestations of this "go for broke" behavior. Specifically, we find that (1) SBOs made late in the investment period underperform markedly compared to other SBOs; (2) primary buyouts made late in the investment period do not underperform markedly3 compared to other PBOs; (3) the average SBO exhibits strong underperformance; and (4) SBO underperformance disappears once we remove late investment SBOs, i.e. those most likely to have been made due to "go-for-broke" incentives.
Our results mean that secondary buyouts are heterogeneous. A sub-set of SBO transactions seem to result from an agency conflict and they underperform. However, some secondary buyouts seem to be done for fundamental reasons and they do not underperform. This fundamental view of secondary buyouts was already expressed in Jensen's (1989) "Eclipse of the public corporation" seminal paper: "The very proliferation of [LBO] transactions has helped create a more efficient infrastructure and liquid market for buying and selling divisions and companies. Thus LBO investors can "cash out" in a secondary LBO or private sale without recourse to a public offering." In this view, the growth of private equity makes it more likely that two private equity firms will transact with each other. Moreover, the increased professionalization of private equity in the past two decades may lead to more value gains: target companies change (private equity) hands because each successive private equity owner has a set of skills uniquely adapted to a specific stage in the life of the company.
A few recent studies have examined secondary buyouts, but unlike this paper, they all focus on the corporate finance side of SBOs. They test the fundamental view of
SBOs by looking at the operating performance of the companies going through a secondary buyout. Wang (forthcoming) and Bonini (2012) One and Capital IQ in order to determine the investments' exit route and whether a buyout is a primary or a secondary buyout. 435 of these investments are secondary buyouts and 4873 are primary buyouts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 analyzes the transaction costs paid by limited partners in secondary buyouts due to limited partner overlap.
Section 2 studies the cross-section of secondary buyout returns. Section 3 concludes.
Limited partner overlap and transaction costs in secondary buyouts
Limited partner overlap ("LP overlap" for short) occurs when the same limited partner is invested in both the buying fund and the selling fund of a secondary buyout.
Limited partners that find themselves on both sides of a SBO often bemoan the fees they pay in such transactions. There is a widespread view that LP overlap has increased in recent years. 3 As a result, LP overlap has become one of the most contentious issues surrounding secondary buyouts. In this section, we first analyze the transaction costs paid by limited partners in SBOs, then turn to measuring the extent of LP overlap.
Transaction costs
Transactions costs are substantial in any buyout investment. First, an entire company or division is being bought and thus a large amount of due diligence is required.
In addition, large amounts are borrowed and investment banks charge hefty fees for providing this capital. From practitioner interviews we conducted, we obtained the following estimates of transaction costs. Financial advisory is about 2-4 million USD flat plus 1% of the enterprise value (i.e. debt value plus equity value) to be paid by both the buyer and the seller. Legal advisory is 1 to 3 million USD also to be paid by both the buyer and the seller. The buyer also needs to carry some additional due diligence, which tends to be a fixed cost of about $1 million. Finally, the buyer needs to arrange loans with a bank (or a consortium of investors) and the cost is typically 2% of the amount borrowed.
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Thus transaction costs are high in any buyout investment. For a secondary buyout, however, in the presence of LP overlap the relative transaction costs can be considerable.
For ease of exposition, we will first consider a hypothetical example, then a real example.
As a hypothetical example, suppose that in 2001 a pension fund invests $10 million with buyout fund A. Fund A has $100 million in capital, so that the pension fund owns 10% of fund A. Fund A spends its capital on only one transaction, Company ABC, which it holds for ten years. Assume that: 1) transaction costs are 5% of enterprise value for the buyer and zero for the seller; 2) $1 is borrowed for each $1 of equity invested, hence the enterprise value is $200 million; 3) return on equity is 0%. The pension fund indirectly pays 10% of the transaction costs, i.e. 10%*5%*200 = $1 million in 2001 for a ten-year $10 million investment. Now assume that in 2006 the pension fund invested $10 million in Fund B, which has capital of $100 million. In 2006 fund B buys company ABC from fund A -a secondary buyout. In this second transaction the pension fund pays an additional $1 million of transaction cost. The transaction, however, has no effect on the portfolio of companies that the pension fund indirectly owns through its holdings in funds A and B:
after the SBO, the pension fund still holds 10% of company ABC. The pension fund would have been better off if fund A had kept the company for ten years -all else equalbecause it would have saved $1 million (on a $10 million investment).
We now turn to a real example, the Aspen Dental Management SBO transaction This leverage ratio is relatively low compared to historical average but is typical of postcrisis deals. Ares II, although selling, kept a large stake in the company. The amount of equity sold in the SBO was $247.5 million. Through its stake in the selling fund, CalPERS sold $24 million (9.7% of $247.5 million). Through its stake in the buying funds, CalPERS indirectly bought $18.7 million (7.5% of $247.5 million).
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CalPERS paid fees on both legs of the transaction. We estimate the total buyer fees in Aspen at $15 million, and the total seller fees at $10 million. Therefore the total fees paid by CalPERS in the Aspen SBO were about $2.1 million (7.5% of $15 million plus 9.7% of $10 million). Table 2 provides our estimate of the fees paid by each of the nine LPs on both sides of the Aspen SBO. They range from 6% to 66% of equity rebalancing, with a mean of 22%.
In spite of these large transaction costs, it is still possible that the Aspen SBO generated value for the Limited Partners. Perhaps Green V was better positioned than 
Measuring the extent of LP overlap
The extent of LP overlap in SBOs is most easily addressed by considering two matrices. Consider m limited partners indexed = 1, … , and n funds indexed = 1, … , . We define two matrices, = !" , = 1, … , ; = 1, … , and
otherwise. !" = if ! was a buyer in q transactions in which ! was a seller.
We are interested in assessing the extent to which LPs are both buyers and sellers in SBO transactions, through the funds in which they are invested. For any limited partner i, we define LP overlap as
. To interpret this measure, note that the expression !" !" !" is different from zero when three conditions are met: (1) ! is invested in ! ; (2) ! is invested in ! ; and ! bought at least once from ! . When all three conditions are met !" !" !" measures the number of transactions in which ! was a buyer and ! was a seller. Note that since funds do not buy from themselves, !" = 0 when = . Summing !" !" !" over all j and k thus gives the total number of transactions in which ! was on both sides.
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We define the overlap ratio as the LP overlap divided by the number of transactions in which the LP was invested in the selling fund. The overlap ratio measures the probability that the LP was on the buying side of a SBO, given that the LP was on the selling side.
Inspection of the expression
makes clear some properties of our overlap measure. First, the extent of LP overlap is an approximately growing quadratic (hence convex) function of the number of funds that a limited partner is invested in -independently of secondary buyout activity represented by the BUYSELL matrix. Second, a limited partner invested in only one fund cannot be on both sides of a SBO, while a limited partner invested in all funds would achieve an overlap ratio of 100%. The rise of LP overlap over time can thus be interpreted as the product of two causes: (1) an increase in SBO activity-leading to a denser BUYSELL matrix; and (2) an increased involvement of some limited partners in a large number of funds-leading to a denser LPFUND matrix.
Missing data complicates the empirical measurement of LP overlap. If a limited partner has a stake in both the buying fund and the selling fund in an SBO, but we only observe, say, his stake in the selling fund, we will incorrectly code the overlap as zero for this LP and this SBO, creating a bias toward zero in the LP overlap measure. To circumvent this difficulty we restrict our analysis to those limited partners for which Pitchbook has complete data: U.S. pension funds and insurance companies that were involved at least once in a SBO and for which Pitchbook could identify both the selling fund and the buying fund.
In our sample no limited partner that was invested in four funds or less had any overlap in SBOs. Figure 1 reports the distribution of the overlap ratio for limited partners invested in at least five funds. LP overlap is a frequent phenomenon for these LPs: about 60% of them were on both sides of a SBO at least once. 
The cross-section of SBO investment returns

Dataset construction
In order to investigate the cross-section of SBO investment returns we construct a large dataset of SBOs. We make use of both hand-collected information as well commercial datasets. Private equity firms that are raising funds send their track records to potential investors. We collect these fund-raising prospectuses (usually referred to as private placement memorandums-PPMs) to create our basic dataset. PPMs contain the performance and characteristics of all prior investments made by the firm.
The latest wave of fund raising was [2005] [2006] [2007] , so that we have most returns up to that date. For each investment, the exit route may be written in the PPM, or sometimes inferred from it (for example, if we see that a company was sold by Bain and reported as bought by KKR at the same date).
In order to identify any missing exits, we complement our dataset with commercial datasets. We hand-match information to our data using Thomson Banker One, Capital IQ, Pitchbook as well as Zephyr. In such a way we are able to complement information on seller, buyer, duration as well as type of deal. If we still lack deal information, we search online.
Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions of all variables. We classify as secondary buyout a deal in which a PE firm sells the majority of shares to another PE firm. Hence we include tertiaries, fourth buyouts etc. Our definition of SBOs deviates in certain aspects from the definition of commercial databases such as Pitchbook, Thomson Banker One, Zephyr, Capital IQ. We explain our definition of SBOs in detail in Appendix 2.
13 Table 3 shows our sample composition. We have a sample of 1002 SBOs, of which 435 SBOs have return data, and 6830 PBOs, of which 4873 have return data. Figure 4 shows the growth of SBOs as a percentage of buyout activity in our sample. The percentage of SBOs among exits of PE investments grows markedly, from single-digits in the early 1990s to well over 30% in the mid-2000s. Our numbers are consistent with Stromberg (2008). Table 4 reports exit channels and average performance measures for our sample of SBOs versus same-year primary buyouts (PBOs). Several interesting patterns emerge.
Empirical results
Secondary buyouts are much less likely to be exited through an IPO than non-SBO buyouts (11.1% vs. 22.7%). Secondary buyouts are also much more likely than non-SBO buyouts to be exited through another secondary buyout (38.1% vs. 19.9%). These differences are large and statistically significant, suggesting that once a company enters the SBO route, it is likely to stay there and shun public markets. SBOs are also somewhat more likely to end in bankruptcy, and less likely to be exited through a trade sale, but the differences with benchmarks are not statistically significant.
The average SBO strongly underperforms same-year PBOs. Average cash multiples are markedly lower for the average SBO than for benchmarks, as are other measures such as public market equivalents and internal rates of return. The lower performance of SBOs can be ascribed both to a smaller upside and a larger downside: the percentage of "home runs" (i.e. transactions with a cash multiple greater than 3) is 20.1% for SBOs vs. 32.9% for PBOs; the percentage of losses (transactions with a cash multiple less than 1) is 31.0% for SBO's compared to 21.4% for PBOs.
Secondary buyouts exhibit somewhat less volatile performance, but only because their upside returns are lower. When we compute it in the loss region, the volatility of SBO performance (measured as the standard deviation of the cash multiple) is actually slightly higher for SBOs than for benchmarks.
The average duration of SBOs is longer than that of benchmarks (4.4 vs. 3.2 years). A couple of interpretations are consistent with this finding. On the one hand, it could be that the buyout form is more suited to some companies. Such companies would stay longer with each private equity owner and would tend to be exited to other private equity owners -consistent with our finding that SBOs tend to exit as SBOs. On the other hand, the longer duration of SBOs could also be merely a sign of poor performance.
Lopez-de-Silanes et al (2011) show that Multiples decrease slightly with investment duration. IRR, naturally, goes down dramatically as a function of investment duration. It thus seems that buyout funds hang on to their losing investments. Table 5 breaks down the performance of secondary buyouts and non-SBOs by exit route and country. Table 5 shows that the underperformance of secondary buyouts relative to benchmarks holds true regardless of the exit route. The effect is strongest with IPO exits and other exits, and much weaker with trade sale and SBO exits.
Interestingly, secondary buyout exits exhibit strong performance -both for SBOs and for primary buyouts. U.S. secondary buyouts perform particularly poorly compared to the secondary buyouts of other countries. In this first-pass analysis we cannot determine whether this is due to, say, a different industry mix, or different market conditions, for U.S. SBOs. For example U.S. SBOs might have occurred disproportionately in industries that enjoyed a boom followed by a bust, or might have been fueled by a lax credit market. But note that U.S. primary buyouts have similar returns than those of other countries, so the underperformance of U.S. SBOs is not a pure U.S. effect. The results of Table 5 motivate our use of industry and country fixed effects in the regression analyses that follow. Table 6 reports the results of a regression analysis of buyout performance on a secondary buyout dummy and control variables. We control for time-fixed effects to capture such important time-dependent drivers of performance as the amount of "money- Robinson and Sensoy, 2011). We also control for investment location and industry fixed effects to capture risk differences. Controlling for country fixed effects should capture an important variation in cost of capital across companies as shown by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) . Standard errors are obtained by inception year clustering to account for the dependence in residuals within a given year (performance is very cyclical in PE). 8 The results of Table 6 broadly confirm the findings shown in the previous tables.
Secondary buyouts exhibit economically large and statistically significant underperformance compared to benchmarks. SBO underperformance holds irrespective of control variables, including when we introduce year, country, and industry fixed effects (models 3-5). Thus SBO underperformance is not just a consequence of credit market booms, industry shocks or country effects. The regressions put equal weight on 8 See Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Robinson and Sensoy (2011) . Tables 4 and 5 . The regression estimates of SBO underperformance in Table 6 are smaller than the measures of Tables 4 and 5: for   example, in Table 6 , Panel A, model 1 estimates an equally-weighted Cash Multiple spread of 0.338 vs. 0.63 (2.61-1.98) in Table 4 (which uses value weights and adjusts for year effects) and 0.64 (2.56-1.92) when only value-weighting (Table 5) .
each transaction, unlike in
In model 5 we introduce three additional explanatory variables related to the buying fund. Buyer Assets Under Management proxies for the size of the buyer. To the extent that due diligence activities and buyout company management are subject to diseconomies of scale, we might expect larger buyers to perform worse (Lopez de Silanes et al. 2012) . We find support for this idea -the coefficient on Buyer assets under management is negative for all three performance measures, and statistically significant for two out of three.
Buyer Experience is defined as the number of deals that the private equity firm has done minus the average number of deals done by or other private equity firms that year. One might think that greater buyer experience could translate into superior investment performance, but this is not the case. The coefficient on Buyer Experience is positive but not statistically significant.
Finally, a more focused buyer might be better able to generate value -the coefficient on Buyer Portfolio Concentration has the expected positive sign, but it is not statistically significant (Lerner, Kovner and Scharfstein, 2011). Table 6 , Panels B and C show the same regression results but changing the return metric to PME (Panel B) and IRR (Panel C). Results are similar. Overall, Table 6 suggests that SBO underperformance is a robust phenomenon. To test this we need to restrict the sample to deals made by funds for which we know all the other investments and by funds that have limited life (i.e. non ever-green funds).
Consistent with the agency view, Table 7 strongly suggests that SBOs made late in the investment period of a fund underperform. We regress performance measures (Cash Multiple, PME and IRR) on a set of dummy variables and control variables. The dummy variables capture whether the transaction is a secondary buyout; whether it was made in the second half of the fund's investment period; whether it was made when "dry powder" (the fund's unspent capital as a share of committed capital) exceeded 50% (i.e. when less than 50% of the fund's money has been invested at the investment inception date); and an interaction of late Investment and high dry powder. We include year, country and industry fixed effects, as well as the same set of control variables as in Table   6 , model 5 (Investment Size, Stock-Market Return, Buyer Asset Under Management, Buyer Experience, Buyer Portfolio Concentration). Table 7 shows that other things equal, a secondary buyout made late in the investment period is associated with about one less unit of cash multiple (panel A), 0.57 to 0.69 less units of public market equipment, (panel B), and a 23 to 29 percentage point lower internal rate of return (panel C), depending on the specification. Interestingly, the negative impact of a late investment only applies to secondary buyouts, not other buyouts. Our results strongly suggest that the completion of a secondary buyout late in the investment period of the fund reflects money burning behavior, consistent with the "go for broke" incentives of Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2009).
These magnitudes are large. They imply that a $100 investment in a PBO made in the second half of the investment period of a fund, and which would return an average of $250 gross of fees, would return only about $140 [=250-(1.003+0.102)*100 based on model 2 of Table 7 )] in a SBO also made in the second half of the investment period of a fund.
We do not detect an association between high dry powder and poor future investment returns. This is not really surprising, as high dry powder typically coincides to the early part of the fund's investment period. When we interact SBO made in 2 nd part of investment period and Dry powder above 50%, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant for two performance measures out of three. But high dry powder is a rare occurrence in the second half of a fund's investment period, so that the statistical power of our test is low. Similarly in model 3, high dry powder variable has a large economic magnitude but no statistical significance. Table 8 focuses on seller characteristics, and therefore restricts the analysis to the cross-section of SBOs, excluding PBOs. We require transactions to contain data on both the primary deal and the secondary deal. As a result, the number of observations falls substantially, to a number between 186 and 263 (out of 435 SBOs for which we have investment returns data).
We examine the impact of five potential determinants of secondary buyout investment performance: (1) Previous transaction duration: the longer the previous owner has held the asset, the less marginal value gains are likely to remain; accordingly, we expect a negative coefficient on this variable;
(2) Seller Portfolio Concentration: a specialized seller is more likely to have made the right improvements to the portfolio company already;
(3) Previous transaction performance: Like for previous transaction duration, we might expect the investment performance of a secondary buyout to be lower when the first deal was most successful. High returns on the first deal may be at the expenses of the buyer.
(4) Seller experience: a more experienced seller is more likely to have extracted all the possible value from a company, leading to likely lower investment performance for the next owner; he may also be more experienced at selling and would sell for a higher price.
(5) Seller Asset Under Management: similarly, a larger seller may be more likely to have already maximized the asset's value. Some of the above applies here too.
Seller experience and Seller Asset Under Management turn out to be the strongest determinants of SBO investment performance (we introduce them separately in all regressions as these two variables are highly correlated). Previous transaction performance is positively associated with SBO investment performance: the high average returns generated by sellers in SBOs are not at the expense of the buyers -consistent with the fundamental view of SBOs and with the notion that some firms are well-suited to 20 buyout ownership, and that new private equity owners can bring additional value gains, even if the first private equity owner has already generated value.
Conclusion
Private equity firms are increasingly selling their portfolio companies to other private equity firms. This exit channel -called secondary buyout -is now more prominent than public listings for private equity stakes. As institutional investors may have a stake in both the buying and the selling fund, each transaction carries a significant cost for them while the corresponding rebalancing of their portfolio is minimal. For the sub-set of investors for which information on their private equity fund portfolio is publicly available, we provide an estimate of the frequency at which they are on both sides of the transaction and estimate the related cost. In addition, we assemble a comprehensive and unique sample of secondary buyouts, for which we have information on performance. We find that the seller obtains returns as high as those obtained with public listings. The buyer, however, obtains returns that are lower than average.
Consistent with both the agency conflict view of Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach
(2009) and the fundamental view of Jensen (1989) , the underperformance of secondary buyouts is confined to transactions made under "go for broke" incentives, i.e. towards the end of the fund's investment period.
Appendix 1: Variable Description
PE firm: A private equity firm (PE firm) is an organization that undertakes buyout investments. Since the focus of the paper is on the PE industry, we exclude from the sample firms specifically raising money for venture capital or other alternative investments such as timber, infrastructure, land, real estate, or mezzanine. These asset classes are sometimes also referred to as private equity.
PE fund:
A private equity fund (PE fund) is a buyout investment fund that is managed by a PE firm. A PE firm may have several funds running at the same time. The typical PE firm launches a new fund every two to four years. Funds have a finite life lasting ten to fourteen years.
Investment:
An investment is a private equity transaction realized by a PE firm. PE firms report their investments per company. So we follow this practice considering one company as a single investment including all "add-on" acquisitions and divestments made by the company as part of the same investments. We exclude debt and public equity investments.
Multiple:
The multiple of the investment is the ratio of total cash received from the investment plus its current valuation (if not fully liquidated) to the total cash invested. The measure is gross of fees. Different PPM use different currencies to report performance: 57% of PPM use US dollars, 29% use euros, 9% use GBP, and 5% use other currencies such as yen and Canadian dollars.
Duration:
The length in years between the investment initiation date and the investment exit date. The source of the year of investment initiation is the PPM in 100% of the cases.
IRR:
The internal rate of return, gross of fees, of the investment.
PME:
The public market equivalent (PME) is the ratio of the present value of dividends to the present value of the amount invested. To calculate this measure, we assume that the full amount of the investment is made at the investment initiation date, and that all distributions take place at the exit date. To discount the cash flows, we use CRSP value-weighted return series. The measure is gross of fees and is computed in the currency originally used in the PPM to report performance.
Secondary Buyout: Variable taking the value Secondary if majority of shares are sold by a PE company directly to another PE company.
Log investment size:
The natural logarithm of the total amount of equity paid by the PE firm for the investment. Total equity is also called investment size and is used to weight investment performance within a fund or a block.
Home run:
We classify investments as "home runs" if their Multiple is above 3.
Losses:
We define Losses as investments with a multiple below one.
Fund Age:
The difference between the year of investment and the vintage year of the fund.
Stock-Market Return:
The equally-weighted arithmetic average return of the CRSP index during the investment life.
PE Firm Assets under Management:
Assets under management of the PE Firm in million USD as reported by Galante's Venture Capital & Private Equity Directory (alternatively Thomson Banker One if the variable is missing).
PE Firm Experience:
The number of deals made previously by the PE firm. To capture the relative experience we subtract the average number of deals made by PE firms which made a deal this year.
(With a lower boundary of 1 as a firm cannot have negative experience).We then take the logarithm.
Industry fixed effects:
Fixed effects based on the industry of the investment. The industries are manually assigned to one of the forty-eight Fama-French industry classification using their SIC 25 codes or their would-be SIC codes (based on the information in siccode.com). We classify as "machinery" the industry of 112 investments for which the PPM reported "manufacturing" as the sector and we could not find further details in other databases. The information sources for the industry of the investments are the PPM (60%), the websites of PE firms (16%), the Thomson database (20%) and the Capital IQ database (4%).
Time fixed effects:
Fixed effects based on the year of investment initiation Country fixed effects: Fixed effects based on the country of investment location. The information sources for the country of the investment are the PPM (34%), the websites of PE firms (30%), the Thomson database (33%), and the Capital IQ database (3%).
Log fund size:
The natural logarithm of the capital committed to the PE fund in million of US dollars. The information sources for the variable are the PPM (72%), the websites of PE firms (12%), and the Thomson database (16%) Dry Powder: Dry powder is one minus sum invested up to the focal investment divided by total invested by the fund.
The 2nd part of investment period: Dummy variable equalling one if the investment has been undertaken 2.5 years after the date of a fund's first investment. We chose the 2.5 cut-off point as 90% of investment periods are 5 years long.
Previous transaction duration:
Variable exists only for SBOs. Holding period of company of previous PE owner of given portfolio company in a SBO transaction.
Previous transaction performance:
Variable exists only for SBOs. Performance of seller of the given portfolio company in multiple in a SBO transaction.
Appendix 2: Our SBO definition, special cases, and differences with commercial databases
We define a secondary buyout (SBO) as a transaction in which a private equity firm sells the majority of the shares of a company to another private equity firm. Our definition leads us to exclude certain transactions that commercial databases list as SBOs.
Trade sale to PE-owned company: The portfolio company was bought by a portfolio company of a PE owned company (thus not directly by a PE company as in a standard SBO). We label such deals as mergers. Secondary block: this is a transaction in which only a minority of shares of a portfolio company was bought by a PE company from the PE owner. For example Triton sold a block of 20% of Tetra GmbH to AXA Private Equity. We label this transaction "Secondary Block", rather than SBO. Table 2 reports the breakdown of the transaction costs in the Aspen Dental Management SBO in October 2010. Nine investors (limited partners) are invested both in the buying fund (out of 40 LPs in total) and in the selling fund (out of 22 LP in total) according to Pitchbook. We compute their estimated share of transaction fees using the same methodology as in Table 1 .
Rebalancing amount ($ million)
Relative transaction cost (1) Table 3 : Descriptive statistics per investment inception year This table shows our sample of buyout investments by inception year. Results are shown separately for the sub-sample of Secondary Buyouts (SBOs) in Panel A and for the subsample of Primary Buyouts (PBOs; i.e. non-SBOs) in Panel B. An investment is classified as Secondary Buyout if the company was owned in majority by buyout funds right before the focal transaction. All the transactions are made by buyout funds; they can be ever-green or with a fixed duration. The classification as "buyout funds" is self-declared by the fund. Four time-series are displayed. The first column shows the total number of investments; the second column shows the number of investments for which we have information on exit status (e.g. IPO, trade sale, still not exited); the third column shows the number of liquidated investments (we may or may not know their exit route); the fourth column shows the number of investments that are liquidated and for which we know performance (we may or may not know their exit route).
Table 4: Characteristics of Secondary versus Primary Buyouts
This table compares the characteristics of the sample of Secondary Buyouts (SBOs) to that of the sample of Primary Buyouts (PBOs). All the buyouts are liquidated and the underlying company is headquartered in either North America or Western Europe (including UK & Scandinavia). For each year, we compute statistics for investments that were started that year; we do this separately for the sample of SBOs and PBOs. The yearly statistics are aggregated across years by the number of SBOs made that year. These aggregated statistics are computed for three sets of investment characteristics and are displayed in the table. The first set of characteristics contains the percentage of investments (size-weighted) that are exited via IPO, trade sale, secondary, bankruptcy, other (e.g. sale to management), and the percentage of notexited deals. Investments that are exited but for which we do not know the exit channel are excluded from this computation. The second set of characteristics contains the (sizeweighted) average Multiple (total amount received by the fund divided by total amount invested by the fund), the median and standard deviation of the Multiple, the fraction (sizeweighted) of Multiples that are above three and below one respectively, and the standard deviation computed among money-losing investments (i.e. Multiple is below one). The third set of characteristics contains the size-weighted average of the Public Market Equivalent (PME), Internal Rate of Return (IRR), Duration, Fund age at the time of the investment, investment size, average return of the CRSP equally-weighted index during investment's life, the private equity firm assets under management at the time of investment inception (minus the average across other private equity firms that year), the number of investments made by the private equity firm up until that investment (minus the average across firms that year), the Herfindhal index of the industries in which the private equity firm has invested in until that investment. An investment is classified as Secondary Buyout (SBO) if the company was owned in majority by buyout funds right before the focal transaction. Investment size is in 1980 U.S. dollars. More details on the variable construction are provided in Appendix An investment is classified as Secondary buyout if the company was owned in majority by buyout funds right before the focal transaction. All the transactions are made by buyout funds; they can be ever-green or with a fixed duration. The classification as buyout is selfdeclared by the fund. Average performance is weighted by investment size. Investment size is the amount invested by the focal fund in the focal investment (not the transaction value). The unit of observation is a fund-investment. Three performance measures are used: Multiple, Public market Equivalent (PME) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Multiple is the ratio of the total amount distributed divided by the total amount invested. PME is the ratio of the total amount distributed discounted from the exit date back to the inception date of the investment and the total amount invested. Investments with unknown exit routes are added to the "other exited deal" category. (IRR) . Cash Multiple is the ratio of the total amount distributed divided by the total amount invested. PME is the ratio of the total amount distributed discounted from the exit date back to the inception date of the investment and the total amount invested. The sample consists of the secondary buyouts for which we know the performance and the buyer's characteristics. In particular, we need to have the full investment history of the buyer up to that point in order to compute experience, asset under management and portfolio concentration. Secondary Buyout (1/0) is a dummy variable that equals one if the buyout is a secondary transaction, i.e. the seller was a private equity fund, and is zero otherwise. All the control variables are defined in details in appendix table 1. t-statistics are reported in italics below each coefficient; they are based on standard errors clustered by both investment inception year and private equity firms. (IRR) . Cash Multiple is the ratio of the total amount distributed divided by the total amount invested. PME is the ratio of the total amount distributed discounted from the exit date back to the inception date of the investment and the total amount invested. The sample consists of the secondary buyouts for which we know the investment's performance and for which we know both the seller's and the buyer's characteristics. In particular, we need to have the full investment history of the seller up to that point in order to compute experience or portfolio concentration. Control variables include the performance realized by the seller on its investment in that portfolio company, the seller's experience and the seller's portfolio concentration. The next two control variables are dummy variables. The first one equals one if the experience of the seller is above median while the experience of the buyer is below median; and is zero otherwise. The second one equals one if the country Herfindhal index (i.e. portfolio concentration) of the seller is above median and the country Herfindhal index of the buyer is also above median; and is zero otherwise. All the control variables are defined in details in appendix The overlap ratio is defined as the number of SBOs in which the investor (i.e. limited partner; LP) was invested in both the buying fund and the selling fund, divided by the number of SBOs in which the LP was invested in the selling fund. The LPs are all U.S. pension funds and insurance companies listed by Pitchbook as having been involved at least once in a SBO, and for which Pitchbook could identify the selling fund and the buying fund. LP overlap ratio vs. number of funds that LP is invested in 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
